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Abstract 
 In the US, the 49 largest metro regions account for more than 70% of GDP. Large metro 
regions are, and will continue to be, the centers of US growth and prosperity. Therefore, it is 
important to determine how to govern metro regions to ensure their continued economic success. 
Do united metro region governance structures result in better spending policies oriented towards 
long-term economic growth, or, do fragmented metro regions prosper because local government 
competition fuels more effective spending policies? 
 By looking at metro region unity, local government spending policies, and the economic 
growth of the 49 largest US metro regions, I find that united local government is better for 
economic growth. In united regions, local governments face less pressure from neighboring 
municipalities to compete for people and firms in the short-term. This allows municipalities in 
united regions to engage in less short-term consumption spending designed to lure consumer-
voters from neighboring municipalities, resulting in improved economic growth prospects for the 
entire region. These conclusions suggest that to encourage economic growth in our large metro 
regions, we should pursue governance structures at the metro region level, rather than the village, 
town, city, or county level.  
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Introduction 
More people than ever before are living in US cities, and global and national trends 
towards urbanization show no signs of slowing. Over the last century, the growth patterns of 
American cities have widely diverged. Some cities have annexed surrounding municipalities as 
they’ve grown, while other cities have maintained the same boundaries they had in the early 
1800s when the urban area was nothing more than a village. Some cities have maintained density 
and vibrancy, while others have succumbed to sprawl and central city divestment in favor of the 
suburbs. Some cities have experienced robust economic growth, while others have wallowed in 
misery and bankruptcy. With the continued growth of the US urban population, city and metro 
region governance is an interesting question, especially for how it relates to metro region 
economic growth. 
There are several determinants of local economic growth, though the amount of local 
control over these policy areas vary (Florida 2002; Glaeser 2011; Carlino and Saiz 2008; Jones 
1990; Munnell and Cook 1990; Mathur 1999, Coe and Helpman 1995). Figure 1 outlines factors 
influencing economic growth, delineating those factors that local governments have some control 
over. 1 
 
Figure 1 
Factors affecting local economic growth 
 
  
 
For those determinants that policymakers can control, how does municipal government 
fragmentation in metro regions impact policies and ultimately economic growth? Faced with the 
threat of competition from surrounding municipalities in their metro region, do local 
governments adopt shortsighted tax and spending policies in pursuit of economic development? 
Or, does intra-region competition spur municipalities to adopt better policies? Additionally, do 
the policies of local governments affect growth? Or, is the growth of metro regions determined 
by forces outside of local government control?  
In metro regions that are less united (and therefore more fragmented), this paper presents 
evidence that the intra-metro region competition local governments face results in increases in 
services consumption spending that depresses economic growth. This conclusion was drawn by 
measuring the unity of metropolitan regions vis-à-vis their central city (with the boundaries of 
metro regions and classification of central cities coming from the US Census), and comparing 
unity scores to municipal spending policies and economic growth rates to see if unity in metro 
areas affected economic growth by acting through a few key policy spending areas. Figure 2 
gives a visual representation of the relationships explored in this paper, showing how local 
                                                 
1 Cities are a creation of state governments, and can only enact their own policies if they are a charter or home rule 
city. All of the cities in this paper are charter or home-rule cities. (Coester 2004). 
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government unity in metro regions can impact the spending policies of municipalities, and then 
how these spending policies can ultimately impact economic growth. 
 
Figure 2 
Relationship between unity, spending policies, and economic growth 
 
 
 
Chicago presents an interesting example for how local governance may be impacting 
policies and ultimately economic growth. Flying through Chicago is a miserable experience. Of 
the 30 busiest airports in the US, Chicago’s Midway is the third worst for on-time departures. 
O’Hare is the fourth worst. Robert Sturgell, former head of the Federal Aviation Administration, 
has said that “a new Chicago airport, or a vast expansion of one of the city’s existing airports 
will be necessary to keep pace with booming demand for air travel in the coming decades” (Tarm 
2008).  
Despite recognizing that air infrastructure improvements are necessary, a lack of regional 
cooperation amongst municipal governments in Chicago is preventing improvements. The 
Chicago metro area is composed of nearly 1,751 local government entities, with policymakers 
representing diverse constituencies. This makes cooperation difficult, even for projects such as 
airport expansion that most people agree are necessary. The debate over how to expand 
Chicago’s air infrastructure has pitted urban officials favoring O’Hare expansion against 
northern suburb officials opposed to an O’Hare expansion because of the increase in noise it 
would cause, and southern suburb officials favoring a suburban airport (Mora 1999). 
The inability of local governments in Chicagoland to cooperate on airport expansion may 
impact future economic development. Archer Daniels Midland (ADM, currently 27 on the 
Fortune 500 list) is looking to move its global headquarters to a city where investors can “get on 
a plane and fly nonstop to [their] headquarters” (Knight 2013). Chicago is currently in 
competition with Minneapolis and St. Louis for this multinational corporation that pays more 
than $400 million dollars of Illinois salaries and taxes each year (Hinz 2013). Though local 
government disagreement over air infrastructure improvements may not impact Chicago’s ability 
to woo ADM in the short-term, in the long-term, it is easy to imagine a continued lack of 
cooperation on airport expansion resulting in inaction, and the loss of future economic benefits.  
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Recipe for a Successful City 
Municipal governments in urban areas can enact their own tax structures and 
autonomously create spending policies. Additionally, municipal level decisions can have a large 
impact on the location choices of people and firms. According to the Tiebout model, the 
decisions of local municipalities play a large role in economic development. Municipal 
governments can structure their spending and tax schemes in different ways to attract people, and 
“consumer-voters” will move to communities that satisfy their public good preferences. 
Municipalities can affect their growth by adopting spending and tax bundles that are attractive to 
residents and businesses (Tiebout 1956). Several studies demonstrate the validity of this model. 
One such study found that property tax increases without increases in public goods provision will 
result in lower property values, with the decrease in property values a result of consumer-voters 
exhibiting less demand for the municipality. (Oates 1969, 968). Additionally, a recent study 
found that improvements in air quality in communities resulted in inflows of richer households. 
That is, wealthy consumer-voters adjusted their locational preferences because of local 
characteristics, showing that people can and do vote with their feet (Banzhaf and Walsh 2008).  
However, some have challenged the idea that municipal governments are in complete 
control of their economic fate through the tax and expenditure schemes they develop.  During the 
1800s, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Milwaukee were investing in train infrastructure in 
the hopes of becoming the “gatekeeper” to the west. Chicago became the dominant city in spite 
of the fact that St. Louis, with its location on the Mississippi, was the more logical choice. This 
leads to the conclusion that the policies local governments implement may not be the only 
determinant of economic growth, though they are certainly a factor (Schragger 2010).  
Assuming that cities can to some extent control their economic fate, there are three broad 
spending policy areas that determine city growth: human capital investment and amenities 
spending, infrastructure investment, and social services and welfare spending. 
 
Human Capital: Amenities and Investment 
For a city and its metro region to grow its economic pie, it needs to have a large amount 
of human capital; the educated people who will produce the ideas and innovation necessary to 
compete in a knowledge-based global economy. (Florida 2002).  
Amenities are a key determinant of municipal economic growth because they increase the 
municipality’s human capital by influencing the location choices of people and firms. Smart 
people are a fickle commodity because they have the ability to move. Therefore, municipalities 
will be in constant competition with municipalities in their metro region, and other metro 
regions, for the intelligent people they need to facilitate economic growth. Research shows that 
quality of life and amenities are a key factor in attracting smart consumer-voters to cities, and 
that these smart people cause economic growth. If cities and their metro regions provide high 
levels of amenities, it means that they will attract the talented consumer-voters so crucial to the 
production of new ideas necessary to thrive in a globalized marketplace (Florida 2002; Glaeser 
2011; Carlino and Saiz 2008). If amenities can influence economic growth by attracting smart 
people to cities and their metro regions, then determining that certain government structures 
promote amenities investment would be an important finding for figuring out how to govern 
urbanized metro areas.  
Though the accumulation of amenities may be a worthy goal in and of itself, for 
economic growth, the real value lies in their ability to attract human capital to a city and its 
metro region. An additional component to economic growth is the accumulation of home-grown 
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human capital through government expenditures on schools, universities, and research parks. 
Investments in human capital are important because they develop the talented, creative people 
that are the essential input in formulating new ideas and products. In order to be successful, 
municipalities need to have high levels of human capital, which they can get through attraction 
(by providing amenities) or by nurturing human capital through expenditures (human capital 
investment).   
Research shows that an individual’s increase in human capital is a determinant of 
economic growth because it leads to innovation and individual productivity increases and 
resulting spillover benefits. Furthermore, government spending is necessary for human capital 
accumulation. Highly skilled employees often leave firms, so firms will under-invest in human 
capital, meaning governments must pick up the provision of this quasi-public-good (Mathur 
1999; Coe and Helpman 1995). As with amenities spending, if it is found that certain local 
government structures lend themselves to greater investments in human capital, then this should 
influence how we govern metro regions because of the importance of human capital to economic 
growth.  
 
Infrastructure Investment 
In addition to human capital, infrastructure is an important ingredient in the economic 
growth of municipalities. For the purposes of this paper, infrastructure that relates to city growth 
includes transportation (airports, roads, and ports), sewer and water management expenditures, 
and utilities2. These are the basic structural items that people and businesses need to survive and 
thrive. Things such as highways, sewer systems, and electricity are all forms of backbone 
infrastructure that are essential for people, businesses, and regions to reach their full economic 
potential. However, these are all items with high costs and diffuse benefits that the private sector 
often does not provide, leaving government to fill the provision void. Research shows that public 
infrastructure investment has a positive effect on economic and employment growth, does not 
crowd out private investment, and makes labor and private capital more productive. Furthermore, 
not all investments have the same return. Investments in sewer systems and highways are 
particularly supportive of economic growth (Munnell and Cook 1990). Determining how local 
government competition affects infrastructure spending decisions will enlighten policymakers as 
to how to structure local governments to maximize the value of spending policies.  
 
Social Services and Welfare Spending 
 However, not all spending is beneficial for municipal economic growth. Just like too 
much salt can ruin a recipe, too much spending on certain areas can wreck a city. Amenities, 
human capital, and infrastructure spending are beneficial because they act as investments. By 
spending money now, the hope is that they will improve the capital stock of the municipality 
later on. Social services, such as welfare programs and police protection, do not have this same 
affect. Jones finds that welfare spending has a negative relationship to economic growth because 
it is consumption spending and not investment spending (Jones 1990, 226). Welfare and services 
spending are short-term consumption expenditures, so they don’t have the same impact on aiding 
economic growth as more investment oriented spending does. Though services and welfare 
expenditures are often necessary, for a municipality to succeed economically, it should keep 
these expenditures to a minimum to allow for more spending on the areas that lay the foundation 
                                                 
2 The data source for this paper does not include a line item for technology infrastructure, like fiber optic cables, 
hence its omission. 
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for future economic growth. If cities and surrounding municipalities in more fragmented regions 
spend more on social services and welfare than cities and surrounding municipalities in united 
regions, then this should encourage regionalism efforts to protect municipalities from existing in 
areas that pressure them into bad spending policies.  
Figure 3 illustrates what the relevant literature suggests the relationship is between 
spending polices and economic growth.  
 
Figure 3 
Relationship between spending policies and economic growth 
 
 
 
Too Many Chefs in the Kitchen: Metro Regions, Cities, and Growth  
Individual municipalities can influence their economic growth in a multitude of ways. 
They can provide more amenities to attract smart and talented residents. They can invest in 
institutions that help people improve their human capital. They can provide the expensive 
support infrastructure that people and businesses need to be successful. Finally, they can limit 
expenditures on social services and welfare. However, municipal governments do not make their 
spending decisions in isolation. In addition to the influence that federal and state policies may 
have, competing local governments can exert pressure on the decisions of neighboring 
municipalities.  
 Human capital investment is an area where municipal government competition in metro 
regions can adversely impact spending policies. Human capital is an amorphous concept. Unlike 
investments that have tangible returns, increasing human capital through educational gains is 
hard for people to conceptualize. Additionally, investments in human capital may not pay 
dividends to the investor. If municipal governments increase a person’s human capital by giving 
them new skills, there is no guarantee that they will receive the benefits from that person because 
people can move.  
Spillovers to human capital investment also exist. The productivity gains to human 
capital investment generally don’t accrue to just one person, but everyone that they may work 
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with. Because of this, local municipalities, especially those in fragmented regions where there 
are many other municipal governments, might have incentives to under invest in human capital. 
If all local governments except for one invest in human capital, then that lone municipality will 
benefit from productivity gain spillovers. In this hypothesized world, this municipality will 
receive a large benefit at very little cost. This creates incentives for all local governments to 
attempt to free ride, potentially leading to a chronic underinvestment in human capital. 
Fragmented metro regions may experience an amplification of this underinvestment. As the 
number of local government structures increases, it means each government will have an even 
greater interest in attempting to free ride. Although human capital investment has substantial 
returns to the area that does the investing, these returns can migrate across regions. The fact that 
knowledge spillovers exist may decrease municipal human capital investment (Coe and Helpman 
1995; Glaeser et al 1991). 
 Furthermore, fragmented local government in a metro region can have an adverse effect 
on infrastructure investments. Though infrastructure investments are good, they do have 
decreasing marginal returns. There are only so many sewer systems, roads, etc. that places need. 
By not having a coherent infrastructure investment plan, the aggregation of individual municipal 
government spending decisions in a metro region may mean an over provision of infrastructure, 
or a failure to provide the right infrastructure, resulting in a sub-optimal use of public funds. This 
sub-optimal use may then cause an exodus of consumer-voters moving to other metro regions 
throughout the US that have more cooperative and effective spending policies across local 
governments. For example, the creation of the first interstate highway system will have a greater 
impact on productivity and economic growth than the creation of a second interstate highway 
system, illustrating the diminishing returns to infrastructure investment (Fernald 1999). In 
fragmented metro regions, increasing municipal governments may result in duplicitous 
investments in areas such as sewer systems, as separate governments construct their own 
systems, even if the need isn’t there.  
 In addition, local government services and welfare spending can rise in fragmented 
regions. If municipalities are constantly competing for people and jobs, then newer, suburban 
municipalities may be able to lure affluent residents away from central cities and older 
municipalities by offering consumer-voters public goods for immediate consumption in the form 
of increased services spending. This results in the central city being left with a population that 
requires more welfare services (meaning the city has less money to devote to good types of 
spending), and a smaller tax base that they can draw from, and suburban communities spending 
inordinate amounts of money on services to attract residents (Ornstein 1982).  
Finally, high levels of government fragmentation that result in sub-optimal spending 
policies can have their negative affects amplified. Because of the close proximity of local 
governments to each other in a metro region, the negative effects of competition can reinforce 
themselves. The economic growth of one municipality is connected to the growth of its 
surrounding municipalities. Just as a rising tide raises all ships, a sinking municipality can drag 
down its neighbors, causing ever-expanding economic dead-zones. This is especially apparent in 
the relationship between the central city and the region as a whole. Because the central city is 
often the dominant economic and political force in a region, an economically declining central 
city can have an adverse effect on surrounding cities, towns, villages, counties, etc. Studies show 
that there is a strong positive correlation between the economic condition of central cities and 
their metro regions (Furdell and Wolman 2006) and that the economic fates of metropolitan 
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regions closely follow the fate of central cities (Savitch et al. 1993). These studies show that 
there is a linkage between the growth rates of municipalities within a region. 
In cohesive metro areas, people can no longer act in accordance with the Tiebout model 
and easily express their preferences for different municipalities. Metro region unity prevents 
people from self-selecting out of central cities and into other municipalities within the metro 
region that may have an adversarial relationship with the central city. This spares central cities 
from confronting shrinking tax bases, needy populations, and inhibited growth potential. 
Additionally, it prevents local governments in the same metro region from competing with one 
another for residents and businesses by offering services, public goods for immediate 
consumption to lure consumer-voters. If there is a strong linkage between the growth rates of 
neighboring municipalities, with the central city having a particularly large impact on metro 
region growth, then we do not want to have fragmented government structures that encourage 
competition and bad, short-term focused spending policies. Metro region government unity can 
prevent people from using their location decision power to inadvertently force local governments 
in the same metro region into competition, resulting in bad spending policies and inhibited 
economic growth potential.   
 
An Empirical Analysis 
 If metro region government unity can prevent municipalities within the same metro 
region from competing for residents and businesses by pursuing bad spending policies, then 
metro regions with more united local governments should experience stronger economic growth. 
This paper looks at the impact of government fragmentation on spending policies for the central 
city, and for all local governments in a metropolitan region, and then at the impact of spending 
policies by central cities and all local governments in a metro region on the economic growth of 
the metro region. 3   
 
1. Unity and Central City Spending Policies 
Hypothesis: Greater local government unity will result in more spending on infrastructure, 
human capital, and amenities, and less spending on services and welfare by central cities. 
Observable implications: A positive correlation between unity and central city budget 
allocations for infrastructure, human capital, and amenities, and a negative correlation between 
unity and central city budget allocations for services and welfare spending.  
 
2. Central City Spending Policies and Economic Growth 
Hypothesis: Long-term investment oriented spending on infrastructure, human capital, and 
amenities is good for economic growth. Short-term consumption spending on welfare and 
services is bad for economic growth. 
Observable implications:  A positive correlation between central city infrastructure, human 
capital, and amenities spending, and economic growth, and a negative relationship between 
central city services and welfare spending and economic growth.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Taxes are an important determinant of economic growth within a municipality’s control. Given the complexity of 
tax schemes and the fact that low taxes may not be the best policy, they will not be addressed in this paper. 
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3. Unity, Central City Spending Policies, and Economic Growth 
Hypothesis: Metro region unity is good for economic growth because it encourages long-term 
investment oriented spending policies in central cities. 
Observable implications: A positive correlation between metro region unity and central city 
infrastructure, human capital, and amenities spending, and a positive correlation between those 
spending categories and economic growth. A negative correlation between unity and central city 
services and welfare spending, and a negative correlation between those spending categories and 
economic growth. 
 
4. Unity and Metro Region Spending Policies 
Hypothesis: Greater local government unity will result in more spending on infrastructure, 
human capital, and amenities, and less spending on services and welfare by all local governments 
in a metro region. 
Observable implications: A positive correlation between unity and metro region budget 
allocations for infrastructure, human capital, and amenities, and a negative correlation between 
unity and metro region budget allocations for services and welfare spending.  
 
5. Metro Region Spending Policies and Economic Growth 
Hypothesis: Long-term investment oriented spending is good for economic growth, short-term 
consumption spending is bad for economic growth. 
Observable implications: A positive correlation between metro region infrastructure, human 
capital, and amenities spending, and economic growth, and a negative relationship between 
metro region services and welfare spending and economic growth.  
 
6. Unity, Metro Region Spending Policies, and Economic Growth 
Hypothesis: Metro region unity is good for economic growth because it encourages long-term 
investment oriented spending policies by all local governments in a metro region. 
Observable implications: A positive correlation between metro region unity and metro region 
infrastructure, human capital, and amenities spending, and a positive correlation between those 
spending categories and economic growth. A negative correlation between unity and metro 
region services and welfare spending, and a negative correlation between those spending 
categories and economic growth.  
Figure 4 presents an illustration of the hypothesized relationship between unity, spending 
policies, and economic growth for central cities and all local governments in a metro region.  
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Figure 4 
 
Hypothesized relationship between unity, spending policies, and economic growth 
 
 
 
Data Analysis  
Utilizing the total expenditure line item from the US Census of Local Governments, each 
metro region for each year receives a unity score, which is the amount of spending conducted by 
the central city in a metro region compared to the amount of spending carried out by all the 
constituent local governments in a metro region: 
 
 
Other scholars use fragmentation measurements that include population within 
municipalities or number of local governments (Mitchell-Weaver et al. 2000, 876). However, for 
policies, money is power. There can be thousands of local governments in a region, but if the 
central city spends the majority of the region’s money, then the policies of the region will mimic 
what the policies would be in a region with only one government, which is why this analysis uses 
a score built around central city spending. 
To determine what the spending priorities of a government are, spending line items from 
the Census of Local Governments are placed into categories: infrastructure spending, human 
capital spending, amenities spending, services spending, and welfare spending. The priority 
placed on a given category is measured as the percent of total spending the individual category 
comprises of the budget for the central city and the metro region as a whole (with the metro 
region data calculated by summing up all the expenditures for all local governments in a 
region).4   
The measurement for economic growth rates is the change in median per capita income 
from the beginning to the end of a five-year period. For example, the economic growth rate for a 
                                                 
4See Appendix B for the line items that each category includes. 
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region for 1972 is the percent increase in per capita income from 1972 to 1977. In this way, the 
economic growth measurement is lagged behind the unity and spending policy measurements.  
To determine if unity relates to growth (and if there is then a reason to investigate it in a 
more nuanced manner), economic growth is regressed on unity in a multivariate model 
controlling for the percent of people in a metro region with some level of post-secondary 
education and the geographic region that each metro region is in (New England, West Coast, 
etc.). Post-secondary education is used as a control because it captures what some argue is the 
most important determinant of economic growth. Geographic regions are used as controls to 
account for the broader shift in national economic activity (from the Northeast and Midwest to 
the South and West), weather advantages that certain places may have, and city age (with older 
cities and governance structures in the Northeast and Midwest). Controls for the industrial 
diversity of each metro region or state-local government relationship for each region are not used 
because they are roughly captured in the geographic region control (the industrial mix and state-
local government relationship would be more similar in two western states than in a western and 
northeastern state). 
If higher unity ratio scores (where the central city spends a larger amount of money 
compared to the surrounding region, meaning the region is less fragmented) correlate to higher 
growth rates, than that would suggest that unity has a positive impact on economic growth. It 
would suggest that in metro regions, united local government structures are preferable to very 
fragmented local governments. To understand why this relationship may occur, a series of 
multivariate regression analyses are used to determine if local government unity and its impact 
on central city policies causes economic growth changes. A multivariate regression analysis is 
performed for each individual spending category regressed on unity with controls for post-
secondary education and geographic region to determine if unity impacts local government 
spending policies. Then, a multivariate linear regression analysis is performed with economic 
growth regressed on all the spending categories, controlling for post-secondary education and 
geographic region to determine if the spending policies affect economic growth. The economic 
growth measurement is lagged to measure growth for the five years after the unity and spending 
policy measurements. 
From the regressions, if unity correlates to changes in an individual spending policy, and 
an individual spending policy correlates to economic growth in the same way, then it would 
suggest that unity influences economic growth by working through the spending policy.  These 
regressions are performed for central cities and the aggregation of local governments in a metro 
region. A test is considered statistically significant if its p-value is less than .02. 
Additionally, a Sobel-Goodman mediation analysis is performed on the data. A Sobel-
Goodman test looks at an independent variable, a dependent variable, and a hypothesized 
mediation variable. A positive test would suggest that the impact of the independent variable on 
the dependent variable passes through the independent variable’s impact on the mediating 
variable. For the Sobel-Goodman analysis, each individual budget allocation category for the 
central city and metro region is used as a mediating variable, with the independent variable being 
unity, and the dependent variable being economic growth.  
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Data 
The dataset is the 495 largest metro regions in the US, their constituent counties, largest 
cities, and other local governments. The constituent local governments for metro regions are 
based on US Census categorization of local governments into metro regions. The central city for 
each metro region is the city that leads the naming of the metro region (for example, Atlanta is 
the central city in the “Atlanta – Sandy Springs – Marietta Metropolitan Statistical Area”). The 
spending policy dataset is the US Census of Local Governments and covers the years 1972-2007 
in five year increments. Spending data comes from one source so that the data isn’t biased by 
individual municipality accounting practices. Economic growth data on metro region median per 
capita income changes comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The control data on post-
secondary education comes from the American Community Survey, and the geographic region 
designations are from the US Census Department. 
 
Local Government Unity and Economic Growth 
 The regression results suggests that there is greater economic growth in more united 
metro regions6. The results show that a 10% increase in regional unity correlates to a 1.24% 
increase in metro region growth when controlling for post-secondary education and geographic 
region. Graph 1 presents the unity measurement for each metro region for each year and its 
corresponding growth rate to illustrate the relationship between unity and growth.  
 
Graph 1 
 
Metro Region Unity vs. Economic Growth (each region for each year) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 49 because the author’s hometown and the place he is most curious about, Buffalo, NY, is the 49 th largest US 
metro region.  
6 See Appendix A for a listing of metro regions based on unity. 
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Table 1 displays the multivariate regression results. 
 
Table 1 
Economic growth regressed on unity, education, and region 
 
 
 
Additionally, when looking at the average growth rates for the 10 most and least united 
metro regions for each year, it appears as if metro region unity has a greater impact on growth 
rates during economic downturns. Consistent with the broader trend, the most united regions 
always experience a higher average growth rate than the least united regions over the following 
five years. However, the difference between the average growth rates is larger during economic 
downturns. In 1977, 1987, and 2007, the difference between the growths rates is greater than 
3.0%. Outside of these years, the largest difference is 2.7%. 1977 measures the economic growth 
rates for the years 1977-1982 during the Volcker recession, 1987 measures growth for 1987-
1992 during the Savings and Loans Crises, and 2007 measures the growth rates during the Great 
Recession. The most and least united metro regions each contain a broad cross section of 
geographic regions and size, so the differences in growth rates are probably not attributable to 
some other characteristic inherent in the metro regions. Table 2 presents this data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient P-Value R2 Observations
Metro Region Unity 1.24% 0.008 0.610 392
(0.047)
Post-Secondary Education -9.97% 0.000 0.610 392
(0.043)
New England -0.74% 0.001 0.610 392
(0.023)
Middle Atlatnic -0.26% 0.322 0.610 392
(0.026)
East North Central -0.16% 0.539 0.610 392
(0.025)
West North Central 0.80% 0.004 0.610 392
(0.028)
South Atlantic 0.66% 0.019 0.610 392
(0.028)
East South Central 1.34% 0.000 0.610 392
(0.021)
West South Central 0.47% 0.016 0.610 392
(0.019)
Mountain 0.61% 0.030 0.610 392
(0.028)
Pacific 0.74% 0.001 0.610 392
(0.023)
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Table 2 
Average economic growth differences: most and least united regions 
 
 
 
Since the regression of economic growth on unity presents evidence that there is a 
relationship between unity and growth, especially during economic downturns, it is important to 
look at spending policies to see if the impact of unity on economic growth is a result of the 
impact of unity on the spending policies of local governments, and subsequent impact on 
economic growth. 
 
Unity and Central City Spending 
Cities in metro regions that are 10% more united tend to see a 1.93% increase in 
infrastructure spending, a 2.98% increase in human capital spending, a 1.24% increase in welfare 
spending, a 3.36% decrease in services spending, and no impact on amenities spending. Table 3 
presents the results from a series of multivariate regression analyses where each spending 
category was individually regressed on unity, with controls for post-secondary education and 
geographic region. 
 
Table 3 
Central city spending changes resulting from a 10% increase in unity 
 
 
 
Year Most United Least United Difference
1972 57.59% 56.85% 0.74%
1977 67.58% 61.73% 5.85%
1982 39.27% 38.09% 1.18%
1987 29.47% 26.37% 3.11%
1992 25.82% 23.12% 2.70%
1997 24.27% 21.78% 2.50%
2002 25.23% 24.91% 0.32%
2007 5.26% 1.88% 3.38%
Dependent Variable Coefficient P-Value R
2
Observations
Central City Infrastructure Spending 1.93% 0.000 0.379 392
(0.054)
Central City Human Capital Spending 2.98% 0.000 0.517 392
(0.042)
Central City Amenities Spending 0.04% 0.822 0.096 392
(0.018)
Central City Services Spending -3.36% 0.000 0.452 392
(0.027)
Central City Welfare Spending 1.24% 0.000 0.208 392
(0.022)
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The increases in infrastructure and human capital budget allocations are consistent with 
the idea that greater metro region unity results in more advantageous spending policy decisions. 
Cities that face less intra-region competition may have any easier time justifying long-term 
infrastructure investments and human capital spending. Furthermore, the services spending 
results support the theory of unity resulting in better policies. Lower “bad” spending suggests 
that the central city isn’t facing intra-region pressure from other municipalities to spend money 
irresponsibly. These results suggests that absent pressure to compete intra-metro region for 
consumer voters, central cities enact more prudent spending policies.  
The anomaly for these results is amenities spending and welfare spending. If metro 
region unity encourages good spending, then it should result in greater central city investment in 
amenities. In this instance, the data used to measure amenities spending may not be the proper 
data. Based on the Census of Local Governments, spending on parks and hospitals is categorized 
as amenity spending. These measurements would fail to capture amenity investment, such as 
spending on a convention center, art museum, or sports stadium.7 Furthermore, it would fail to 
account for that fact that many urban amenities are in no way, shape, or form provided by the 
government. The increase in welfare spending is curious, but may be the result of the unity 
measurement capturing larger cities. If the unity measurement captures larger cities, than the 
increase in welfare spending associated with unity may just be showing that larger cities have 
more federal and state devolved authority over welfare program implementation, resulting in 
higher levels of welfare spending regardless of metro region unity.  
 
Central City Spending and Economic Growth 
Though metro region unity has a strong correlation to central city spending decisions, a 
multivariate model regressing economic growth on all spending categories while controlling for 
post-secondary education and geographic region suggest that central city spending decisions do 
not affect economic growth. Table 4 presents the regression results. 
 
Table 4 
 
Economic growth rate changes from a 10% increase in central city category spending  
 
 
                                                 
7 The author is aware that the value of these as amenities is hotly contested.  
Independent Variable Coefficient P-Value R2 Observations
Central City Infrastructure Spending -1.40% 0.090 0.670 392
(0.082)
Central City Human Capital Spending -0.29% 0.729 0.670 392
(0.083)
Central City Amenities Spending 2.45% 0.104 0.670 392
(0.150)
Central City Services Spending -2.68% 0.036 0.670 392
(0.128)
Central City Welfare Spending 0.72% 0.606 0.670 392
(0.139)
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Since there is no significant relationship between any spending policy and economic 
growth, it means that local government unity does not impact economic growth through the 
spending policies of central cities. If that were the case, then there would be a linkage between 
unity impacting spending policies and those spending policies impacting growth. One potential 
explanation is that it takes a long time for city policies to ultimately impact the growth of the 
metro region. However, even lagging the growth rates 20 years (instead of five) and seeing how 
central city policies relates to economic growth results in no relationship between spending 
policies and growth, suggesting that the importance of the central city to regional economic 
growth is overstated.8 
 
Unity and Metro Region Spending 
 Since there was no apparent relationship between unity, central city spending policies, 
and metro region economic growth, it is important to look at the budgeting decisions of the entire 
metro area, utilizing the same two-step process of multivariate regression analysis. 
 From the five multivariate regression models with each individual spending policy 
regressed on unity, controlling for post-secondary education and geographic region, a 10% 
increase in metro region unity aligns with a 1.96% increase in infrastructure spending, a 0.42% 
increase in welfare spending, a 1.22% decrease in human capital spending, a .052% decrease in 
amenities spending, and a 0.39% decrease in services spending by local governments. Table 5 
presents a breakdown of the correlation between a 10% increase in metro region unity and 
aggregate local government budget allocations in metro regions.  
 
Table 5 
Metro region spending changes resulting from a 10% increase in unity 
 
  
 
Increasing unity correlated to greater infrastructure and lower services spending is 
consistent with the central city results, and the idea that greater unity (and less local government 
competition) will result in increases in good spending and decreases in bad spending.  
However, it is surprising that there is a negative relationship between unity and human 
capital and amenities spending, and a positive relationship between unity and welfare spending. 
If unity encourages good spending, then the expectation would be that increasing unity is related 
                                                 
8 See Appendix C for the central city spending policies to 20 year lag economic growth data.  
Dependent Variable Coefficient P-Value R2 Observations
Metro Region Infrastructure Spending 1.96% 0.000 0.278 392
(0.031)
Metro Region Human Capital Spending -1.22% 0.000 0.355 392
(0.022)
Metro Region Amenities Spending -0.52% 0.000 0.209 392
(0.013)
Metro Region Services Spending -0.39% 0.000 0.322 392
(0.010)
Metro Region Welfare Spending 0.42% 0.003 0.397 392
(0.014)
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to increasing expenditures on human capital and amenities. The data do not appear to support 
that conclusion. The fact that welfare spending increases as unity increases may be the result of 
the same phenomenon as in the central city results. Local governments in united regions may 
have more welfare spending responsibilities from the state because they are larger and more 
important relative to local governments in fragmented regions.  
 
Metro Region Spending and Economic Growth 
 For spending policies and economic growth, a model regressing economic growth against 
all categories of spending, controlling for post-secondary education and geographic region, 
suggests that a 10% increase in services spending relates to an 8.63% decrease in economic 
growth rates. Table 6 displays these findings. 
 
Table 6 
 
Economic growth rate changes from a 10% increase in metro region category spending  
 
 
  
The regression analysis suggests increases in services spending are bad for economic 
growth. The substantial decline in economic growth associated with increases in services 
spending agrees with the idea that short term consumption spending can have chilling effects on 
economic growth.  
 Metro region welfare spending nearly has a statistically significant relationship with 
economic growth, with welfare spending correlating to stronger growth. This might be a function 
of the safety net effects of welfare spending. It was noted earlier that more united regions 
experienced stronger economic growth during recessionary periods. The fact that increased 
welfare spending is correlated to stronger economic growth may be the cause of this 
phenomenon. Stronger growth in united metro regions, especially during recessions, may be due 
to increased welfare spending in those regions during recessions, which cushions the impact of 
economic downturns.  
 
Recipe for Growing the Economic Pie 
Metro region services spending is the only linking variable where the unity to spending 
policy regressions and spending policies to economic growth regressions exhibit a consistent 
relationship. Therefore, the regression analyses suggests that the correlation between metro 
Independent Variable Coefficient P-Value R2 Observations
Metro Region Infrastructure Spending 0.60% 0.784 0.673 392
(0.218)
Metro Region Human Capital Spending 1.45% 0.516 0.673 392
(0.224)
Metro Region Amenities Spending -0.51% 0.858 0.673 392
(0.288)
Metro Region Services Spending -8.63% 0.021 0.673 392
(0.371)
Metro Region Welfare Spending 5.62% 0.038 0.673 392
(0.270)
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region unity and economic growth works through local government services spending across all 
local governments in the metro region. Metro region unity correlates negatively to services 
spending, and services spending correlates negatively to growth. This leads to the conclusion that 
unity is good for growth because it results in lower short-term services consumption spending by 
local governments. Figure 5 presents the complete findings of the regression analyses and the 
direction of relationships that are statistically significant. 
 
Figure 5 
Summary of regression findings  
 
 
 
Sobel-Goodman Mediation Test Analysis 
 The results of the Sobel-Goodman mediation tests corroborate the story told by the 
regression analysis. The Sobel-Goodman test looks at an independent variable, a dependent 
variable, and a mediator variable to determine how much of the impact of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable passes through the independent variable’s impact on the 
mediator variable, and subsequent mediating variable impact on the dependent variable. Several 
Sobel-Goodman tests were run with unity as the independent variable, economic growth as the 
dependent variable, and each individual spending category for cities and metro regions as a 
mediator variable. The test results show that unity does have an effect on economic growth, most 
likely through unity’s impact on local government services spending across the metro region.  
Metro region services spending is the only spending variable that the impact of unity on 
economic growth passes through. Nearly 70% of the impact of unity on economic growth passes 
through metro regions services spending. Table 7 outlines the results of the Sobel-Goodman 
tests, with the coefficient outcome listed as the mediating explanation.9  
 
 
                                                 
9 The mediating explanation is the percent of the impact of unity on economic growth that passes through 
each mediating variable. For the Sobel-Goodman test, a small or negative mediating explanation (the test result 
coefficient) is an irrelevant finding. A small mediating explanation means that very little of the impact of the 
independent variable (unity) on the dependent variable (economic growth) passes through the mediating variable. A 
negative coefficient means that the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is opposite the 
impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable that passes through the mediating variable. Unlike the 
multivariate regression analysis, a negative coefficient for the Sobel-Goodman test does not mean that there is a 
negative relationship between the spending category and growth, it means that the impact of unity on growth is not 
related to the unity-spending policy relationship because they operate in different directions.  
 
Independent Variable Direction Mediating Variable Direction Dependent Variable
Metro Region Unity Positive Central City Infrastructure Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity Positive Central City Human Capital Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity None Central City Amenities Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity Negative Central City Services Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity Positive Central City Welfare Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity Positive Metro Region Infrastructure Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity Negative Metro Region Human Capital Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity Negative Metro Region Amenities Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity Negative Metro Region Services Budget Allocation Negative Economic Growth
Metro Region Unity Positive Metro Region Welfare Budget Allocation None Economic Growth
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Table 7 
 
Percent of unity impact on economic growth passing through each spending variable 
 
 
 
The analysis shows that only metro region services spending has a statistically significant 
and relevant relationship to unity and growth. For metro region services spending, nearly 70% of 
the total effect of unity on economic growth passes through the metro region services spending 
budget allocation. Figure 6 shows the impact of economic growth on unity without the mediating 
variable. 
 
Figure 6 
 
Unity and economic growth relationship  
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the impact of a 10% increase in metro region unity on the metro region services 
spending budget allocation. Additionally, it shows that a 10% increase in unity correlates to a 
0.64% increase in economic growth when explicitly excluding metro region services spending. 
Finally, it shows that metro region unity correlates negatively to metro region services spending, 
and metro region services spending correlates negatively to growth. The test shows that unity 
correlates positively to growth, and that unity correlates negatively to services spending and 
Mediator Variable Mediating Explanation P-Value Z-Score Observations
Central City Infrastructure Spending -4.26% 0.550 -0.598 392
(0.015)
Central City Human Capital Spending 1.10% 0.882 0.148 392
(0.016)
Central City Amenities Spending -5.07% 0.360 0.012 392
(0.002)
Central City Services Spending -13.58% 0.448 -0.760 392
(0.038)
Central City Welfare Spending 0.89% 0.892 0.137 392
(0.014)
Metro Region Infrastructure Spending -9.42% 0.431 -0.787 392
(0.025)
Metro Region Human Capital Spending -32.05% 0.002 -3.122 392
(0.022)
Metro Region Amenities Spending -1.43% 0.514 -0.653 392
(0.005)
Metro Region Services Spending 69.79% 0.000 4.769 392
(0.032)
Metro Region Welfare Spending -2.00% 0.620 -0.496 392
(0.009)
 22 
 
services spending correlates negatively to growth, meaning unity correlates positively to growth 
because it results in less services spending.    
 
Figure 7 
 
Unity, metro region services spending, and economic growth relationship 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
“That the poorest and most thinly populated [counties] would be greatly benefitted by the 
opening of good roads, and in the clearing of navigable streams within their limits, is what no 
person will deny…a meeting has been held of the citizens of Jacksonville, and the adjacent 
[county], for the purpose of deliberation and enquiring into the expediency of constructing a 
railroad.”  
-Abraham Lincoln March 9, 1832 
 
Local government cooperation being necessary for growth promoting government 
policies is an old idea. Going back to the Chicago example, it has been nearly 20 years since 
serious debate and studies began to highlight the need for a new airport in the metro area. City-
suburban fragmentation continues to hinder plans to expand air infrastructure in Chicago. If 
Chicago ultimately loses out on the relocation of Archer Daniels Midland, it will be a forgone 
economic benefit to the city. Chicago demonstrates how bad policy caused by regional 
fragmentation can depress economic growth.  
Motivated by situations similar to Chicago, this paper looked at the relationship between 
metro region unity, local government spending policies, and economic growth. The most 
important finding from this study is that metro region unity has a positive correlation to 
economic growth. For policymakers, it suggests that encouraging unity will not have detrimental 
effects on economic growth. Additionally, there seem to be strong relationships between unity 
and the spending policies of all local governments in a metro region. Finally, this paper shows 
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that of the different types of local government spending policies, services spending appears to 
have the most direct relationship to economic growth. Figure 8 shows the linkage between unity, 
metro region services spending, and economic growth.  
 
Figure 8 
 
Unity, metro region services spending, and economic growth linkages 
 
 
 
The metro region data supports the idea that spending on services is bad for economic 
growth, and that unity can combat this bad spending. Metro region unity has a negative 
correlation with metro region budget allocations on services expenditures. Metro region services 
spending budget allocation increases have a negative correlation to economic growth. From 
those two relationships, we can observe the link between unity impacting region wide spending 
policies, and those policies then impacting economic performance. Though it is difficult to prove 
causation, they seem to suggest that unity is good because it will result in lower short term 
consumption spending on services, which is then good for growth, a conclusion the Sobel-
Goodman tests also support. According to the Tiebout model, consumer-voters will move to 
municipalities that provide them with the public goods they desire. In fragmented metro regions, 
this can create a vicious competition for people, forcing local government leaders into short-
sighted overspending on services. Spending that will not have a positive impact on economic 
growth. The data supports this idea as services spending is lower in united regions, suggesting 
that policymakers in those regions don’t face the same intra-metro region pressure to compete for 
consumer-voters and offer them services. Lower service spending correlating to improved 
economic performance then supports the idea that services expenditures are bad, and that we can 
combat them by pursuing policies that foster greater local government unity in metro regions.  
For the other types of spending, the results are inconclusive. They suggest that unity 
generally encourages infrastructure and human capital spending by local governments, 
particularly central cities. This would be consistent with the idea that in united regions, local 
governments can engage in long-term investment oriented spending policies that do not produce 
public goods for immediate consumption. However, the data also suggests that unity encourages 
more spending on welfare, which doesn’t make sense if less competition allows municipalities to 
spend less on immediately consumable public goods. Additionally, outside of services spending, 
there are no spending policies that correlate to economic growth, even though past research 
suggests that local government spending policies have a relationship to economic growth.  
The surprising welfare spending result and lack of a relationship between most spending 
policies and economic growth point to areas for further study. Future research should use a more 
robust data set incorporating more targeted city finance data attuned to the individual quarks of 
local governance, and a greater amount of control variables. The fact that unity seems to 
encourage welfare spending may be because the unity measurement was biased towards larger 
local governments, governments that may have more state devolved power over welfare 
spending (an individual quark outside of the scope of this paper). Additionally, scholars should 
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continue investigating what factors contribute to the economic growth of cities and regions, 
especially factors that are in the control of policymakers. Furthermore, this analysis cannot show 
causation, and it is possible that economic growth causes unity, certain spending policies cause 
unity, or economic growth causes certain spending policies. However, the idea that unity is an 
effect and not a cause is highly unlikely. Local government is a creature of state government and 
changes slowly. Because of this, it is unlikely that unity is impacted much by growth, spending 
policies, or any other variable because of the difficulty in changing state laws in regards to local 
governance. However, it is possible that growth caused certain spending policies. Therefore, 
future research should strive to show causation. 
Despite this paper’s limitations, there is evidence that metro regions should pursue more 
local government cooperation purely for the fact that it will not deter economic growth. In fact, it 
may have a slightly positive impact on growth. Though the impact in any given year on overall 
growth is small (less than 2% according to this analysis), compounded yearly over decades, the 
impact of unity on growth could become quite pronounced. Because fragmentation is still a 
relatively new phenomena (suburbs have only been around since World War II), future research 
into this topic may show an even greater effect of unity on growth than this paper. In addition to 
not deterring growth, unity may in fact be beneficial by lowering competition amongst 
municipalities in the same region for consumer-voters. In hyper-fragmented regions, local 
governments compete with their neighbors for residents and businesses by offering short-term 
services for immediate consumption. Because of the short-term nature of services spending it 
doesn’t aide in economic growth, and detracts from the money that can be spent in other areas to 
help long-term growth prospects. Therefore, unity is probably good for growth because it lowers 
intra-metro region competition, discouraging spending on local government services. The fact 
that cities such as Kansas City, Louisville, Nashville, Jacksonville, Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, 
Toronto and London have all pursued government consolidation initiatives suggests that it is a 
policy local government officials should consider when confronting economic stagnation.  
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Appendix A 
Average metro region unity scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank City Unity Average (1972-2007) Rank City Unity Average (1972-2007)
1 Memphis 0.5763 26 Milwaukee 0.1719
2 New York City 0.5551 27 Orlando 0.1692
3 Nashville 0.5537 28 Boston 0.1688
4 Jacksonville 0.5125 29 San Diego 0.1677
5 San Antonio 0.4332 30 Phoenix 0.1674
6 Richmond 0.3996 31 Seattle 0.1626
7 Baltimore 0.3904 32 Los Angeles 0.1588
8 Austin 0.3772 33 Charlotte 0.1480
9 Washington DC 0.3477 34 Cleveland 0.1467
10 Indianapolis 0.2893 35 St. Louis 0.1396
11 Oklahoma City 0.2629 36 Dallas 0.1391
12 New Orleans 0.2611 37 San Jose 0.1350
13 Philadelphia 0.2579 38 Portland 0.1320
14 Virginia Beach 0.2450 39 Raleigh 0.1282
15 Denver 0.2431 40 Providence 0.1193
16 San Francisco 0.2202 41 Atlanta 0.1097
17 Buffalo 0.2140 42 Las Vegas 0.0975
18 Louisville 0.2120 43 Tampa 0.0945
19 Columbus 0.2101 44 Minneapolis 0.0817
20 Houston 0.2053 45 Pittsburgh 0.0765
21 Detroit 0.2022 46 Sacramento 0.0735
22 Cincinnati 0.1887 47 Hartford 0.0513
23 Chicago 0.1769 48 Riverside 0.0456
24 Birmingham 0.1762 49 Miami 0.0359
25 Kansas City 0.1758
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Appendix B 
 
Line item category classification 
 
Human Capital spending is any spending that is relevant to education. In this case, 
education spending by a municipality includes all spending on elementary, secondary, and 
collegiate education. Amenity expenditures is spending that makes an area more attractive. Parks 
and hospitals are both services that people can use, and may cause people to move to an area. 
Infrastructure spending is any spending that provides necessary services that help business 
operate that the private sector won’t normally provide. Services spending is any spending 
focused on short term consumption. Fire, police, staff, and public buildings (if they are used for 
services employees) are for short term consumption because the services rendered are consumed 
immediately. Welfare spending is any spending that is earmarked for people eligible for federal 
welfare spending (including health spending) and housing subsidies (or municipal expenditures 
linked to supporting communities with heavily subsidized housing). Inspiration for how to 
classify certain types of line item spending was influenced by the work of Andrew F. Haughwout 
(1997, 1999, 2002) for infrastructure spending and Thomas L. Gais (2009) for welfare spending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human Capital Amenities Infrastructure Services Welfare
Education Hospitals Air Transportation Corrections Housing
Libraries Parks Highways Fire Welfare
Parking Health
Sewage Judicial
Utilities Police
Water Management Public Buildings
Water Transportation Staff
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Appendix C 
 
Economic growth rate changes over 20 years from a 10% increase in central city category spending 
 
 
 
Since lagging the economic growth data over a 20 year period doesn’t result in any statistically 
significant relationships between city spending policies and economic growth, it suggests that 
central city spending policies do not impact economic growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient P-Value R2 Observations
Central City Infrastructure Spending -1.93% 0.819 0.001 98
(0.841)
Central City Human Capital Spending 9.62% 0.290 0.012 98
(0.904)
Central City Amenities Spending 5.35% 0.055 0.038 98
(2.753)
Central City Services Spending -3.39% 0.823 0.001 98
(1.516)
Central City Welfare Spending 1.51% 0.442 0.006 98
(1.952)
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